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Background
Since World War II, generations of parents, women’s and anti-poverty groups, labour 
and other allies, have fought for a national, high-quality, affordable and accessible child-
care system in Canada (Friendly and Prentice 2009). Over the decades, each of these 
groups has drawn on a range of rationales, variously positioning the need for out-of-
home childcare as: a gender equity measure; targeted assistance for immigrant and 
working class/single mothers; a poverty reduction strategy; a strategy for balancing work 
and families; a social investment for creating future effective workers; a tool for child 
development during critical years; and an economic stimulus strategy (Prentice 2009). 
At stake in each rationale are concrete policy outcomes which include whether childcare 
should be a universal or targeted programme (or both); a market or publicly funded sys-
tem; and whether fees should be cost shared (with families) or be fully covered by pub-
lic dollars. Over these years, the Child Care Advocacy Association of Canada (CCAAC) 
and other pro-childcare social movement organizations have adopted different advocacy 
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tactics, some more ‘radical’ and politicized and others more conciliatory, depending on 
the political climate and mitigating social and organizational circumstances. In 2005, 
after decades of childcare advocacy and government inaction, national childcare advo-
cates finally expected their work to achieve policy success. Through a detailed analysis 
of qualitative interviews conducted with CCAAC staff, some of their allies, and for-
mer elected government officials and civil servants, this paper identifies and critically 
assesses—as conflictual, cooperation or conflictual-cooperation—the strategies that 
childcare advocates adopted in working with and/or against the Paul Martin Liberal gov-
ernment leading up to this expected policy success. We further explore conditions in the 
sociopolitical environment and/or in CCAAC’s organizational structures that opened 
up the possibilities for cooperation between CCAAC and the Liberal government from 
2003 to 2005.
Childcare resurfaced as a key national policy issue in 2003, when the Jean Chrétien 
Liberal government passed the multilateral framework agreements on early learning 
and childcare (MFA). The MFA committed $1.05 billion for the creation of a childcare 
programme across the provinces and territories (Friendly and Prentice 2009). This pol-
icy announcement appears to have been motivated by the Liberal’s turn towards social 
investment, a move from their earlier rigid neo-liberalism. Dobrowolsky (2009, p. 10) 
explains the underlying motivation behind social investment spending: “investments in 
education, innovation, healthcare, and children (particularly child at risk) would ‘pay off’ 
later by producing skilled, productive workers and preventing a host of expensive social 
ills”.
Likely related to the fact that Chretien’s Liberal government was operating at a surplus 
and hence was relatively generous, the MFA was well received by all provinces and terri-
tories. The MFA set the groundwork for the Paul Martin Liberal government’s early 
learning and childcare (ELCC) Foundations programme rooted in the “QUAD” princi-
ples: quality, universal, accessible and developmentally appropriate early learning and 
childcare services across the country (Friendly and Prentice 2009). By late 2005, the fed-
eral Liberal government had signed bilateral agreements-in-principle with each Cana-
dian province/territory (with the exception of Quebec, which began developing its own 
generous, $5-day childcare programme in 1997) to launch a national childcare system 
based on the Foundations programme (Albanese 2009). While this paper focuses pri-
marily on advocate–federal government relations between 2003 and 2005, it is impor-
tant to note that the day after the newly elected Conservative government took office in 
2006, the bilateral agreements were cancelled. Immediately after his swearing-in cere-
mony, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced that the incumbent 
ELCC Foundations programme would be replaced with a universal child care benefit 
(UCCB)—$100 (monthly and taxable) given to mothers with children under the age of 
six.1 This policy shift was described by the Manitoba Family Services Minister at the 
time as the “greatest U-turn in social policy”. (Bailey 2008). Childcare advocates were 
quick to point out that shifting to a childcare benefit would not increase families’ access 
1 In October 2014, the UCCB (likely in preparation for the 2015 federal election) was increased to $160 (taxable) payable 
to each child under the age of six. In addition, $60 (taxable) per month, again payable to the parent by default, was intro-
duced for children between the ages of 7 and 18.
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to high-quality, affordable childcare programmes (CCAAC 2005). They were proven 
right. By 2008, UNICEF reported that Canada ranked last among twenty-five compara-
tor countries by “failing to attain nine of UNICEF’s ten benchmark indicators of quality 
and access in ECEC provision” (Friendly and Prentice 2009, p. 3). In addition, national 
childcare advocacy organizations were stripped of government funding, making mobili-
zation extremely difficult (Langford et  al. 2013). But before this occurred, there were 
interesting developments and relations between the Liberal government and the 
CCAAC, Canada’s only national grassroots childcare organization.
The childcare movement landscape in Canada
In Canada, a network of national and provincial childcare advocacy organizations 
and allies has expanded and narrowed as governments have affirmed and wavered in 
their commitments to childcare policy. The network has included at least four types of 
social movement organizations (SMOs): grassroots multi-issue advocacy organizations 
(including representation from women’s groups, student federations, anti-poverty); pro-
fessional ECEC workforce sector associations; childcare research-based organizations 
(including those doing childcare policy research and child development and population 
health research); and some trade unions that focus on the childcare needs of their mem-
bers. All four types of SMOs are considered part of the Canadian childcare advocacy 
movement, but each can be distinguished by its organizational structure, membership 
base, resources available and tactics used to pursue the common goal of a national child-
care strategy (Snow and Soule 2010).
For this paper, we selected the Childcare Advocacy Association of Canada (CCAAC) 
as a case study of state–SMO relations, given its unique position as a grassroots organi-
zation that worked with the Liberal government between 2003 and 2005 to develop a 
national childcare policy. The CCAAC, established in 1982 as a national multi-sector 
grassroots organization, is distinguished from the Canadian Child Care Federation 
(CCCF) in several ways. First, the CCAAC emerged as a women’s rights advocacy organ-
ization, unlike the more professional CCCF, whose orientation is to provide resources 
for the ECEC workforce. CCCF members include individuals, representatives from pro-
vincial and territorial professional associations and service providers from the ECEC 
sector. Second, the CCCF has always had paid staff, though they experienced defund-
ing and downsizing following the election of the Conservative government in 2006 
(Langford et al. 2013). Finally, as a result of its governance structure, membership base 
and the increasing constraints of charitable status, the CCCF has adopted an ‘insider’ 
(Briskin and Eliasson 1993; Tyyska 1998) approach to working with government, keep-
ing its public position neutral and strictly non-partisan. In contrast, members of the 
CCAAC (which have not registered charity status) is governed by a board of directors 
with elected representatives from provincial and territorial grassroots childcare SMOs.
Since 2000, the CCAAC has been supported by a ‘Council of Advocates’ to formally 
bring together allied organizations focused on anti-poverty, immigrant/visible minor-
ity women, students, labour, rural childcare, disability and women. Prior to 2007, the 
CCAAC received some federal project funding to carry out specific research initiatives 
and was able to maintain up to six paid staff, including an executive director. Since 2007, 
the CCAAC has operated through the efforts of a paid temporary coordinator, voluntary 
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efforts and most recently, a part-time administrative employee funded by supportive 
labour unions.
On the basis of its grassroots structure and ideological orientation, we expected 
CCAAC’s advocacy tactics to exemplify visible forms of contentious politics such as peti-
tions, protest marches and rallies in public spaces directed at a government which is 
viewed as an adversary (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Snow and Soule 2010). These tactics 
would have been consistent with CCAAC’s long conflictual history with governments.
Prior to 2003, the CCAAC frequently opposed government initiatives that they 
assessed as negatively affecting ECEC provision. For example, in the 1980s when Mul-
roney’s Conservative government introduced The National Child Care Act, many 
advocates fought the legislation on the grounds that funding would be available to com-
mercial as well as not-for-profit services, and a child tax credit would be established 
(White 2001). In the 1990s, childcare advocates opposed the Chrétien Liberal govern-
ment’s abolition of the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), a mechanism that had subsidized 
provincial/territorial childcare services, and its replacement, the Canada Health and 
Social Transfer (CHST), which allowed provinces and territories to spend federal fund-
ing transfers (which were less than CAP expenditures) on their own social programme 
priorities which might not include childcare (Mahon 2009). It was not until 2003 that 
the federal Human Resources Minister Jane Stewart took, as she described it, “the first 
step toward a national childcare program” with the multilateral framework agreement 
on early learning and child care (Friendly and Prentice 2009, p.83).
Over 2003–2005, we anticipated that CCAAC’s advocacy strategies would continue to 
be more conflictual than cooperative, consistent with their past practice. At the same 
time we expected that the sociopolitical environment of 2003–2005, among other poten-
tial conditions, would influence CCAAC’s mobilization choices. To investigate these 
assumptions, we drew on interviews from three groups of ECEC policy stakeholders: 
CCAAC staff and members; individuals involved in CCCF and childcare research-based 
organizations who were CCAAC allies; and former federal and provincial-elected gov-
ernment officials and civil servants, who could offer a range of perspectives on this 
SMO–state relations from 2003 to 2005.
Data for this paper draws on qualitative interviews conducted for a larger project. For 
this study, we analysed informant responses on questions focused specifically on the 
relationship between government and the CCAAC from 2003 to 2005. Our analysis of 
interview data yields several interesting findings that contradict the repertoire of con-
tentious politics strategies we anticipated. CCAAC’s advocacy work from 2003 to 2005 
is best characterized as conflictual-cooperation, a departure from what is conventionally 
expected from a grassroots social movement organization.
Theoretical orientation and literature review
According to Tilly (2004, p. 3) a social movement is contentious “in the sense that it 
involves collective making of claims that, if realized, would conflict with someone else’s 
interests, political in the sense that governments of one sort or another figure in the claim 
making”. Contention is therefore typically evident in campaigns by social actors who try 
to maximize political opportunities by drawing on repertoires of actions and resources 
(Staggenborg 2008, p. 5). Broadening this understanding of contentious politics, Giugni 
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and Passy (1998) propose the concept of conflictual-cooperation. Through an analysis of 
two case studies (cross-national solidarity and ecology movements) they found evidence 
of a repertoire of cooperation with the government built upon an earlier repertoire of 
contention. This analysis also suggests that the state may work through a top-down pro-
cess to integrate a social movement and its organizations because the state lacks the 
knowledge needed for public policy development and problem solving. Giugni and Passy 
(1998, p. 86) maintain that cooperation between social movement actors and the state is 
particularly evident during policy implementation because of the “complexity of prob-
lems and tasks faced by the government”. Three types of cooperation at the individual 
or collective level and that increase in intensity are identified: consultation (movement 
actors serve as advisors), integration (actors serve on panels and committees to develop 
public policies) and delegation (actors assume responsibility for certain tasks in policy 
implementation). Cooperation is also more likely if the SMO has a formal centralized 
structure and full-time staff with which the government can regularly work (Giugni and 
Passy 1998). Drawing on the concept of conflictual-cooperation in their examination of 
the role of civil society in immigration policy making in Italy, Bozzini and Fella (2008, p. 
250) conclude that “the conflictual cooperative relationship between SMOs and institu-
tions defines a qualitatively new form of institutionalization of social actors; SMOs and 
institutions engage in a process in which they actively search for solutions to common 
concerns”. However, all these scholars agree that conflicts can still arise between SMOs 
and the state about the means for reaching a common concern.
New social movements driven by post-materialist values and different kinds of social 
actors (particularly middle-class), are more likely to opt for tactics that involve coop-
eration with the state (Della Porta and Diani 2006; Giugni and Passy 1998; Staggenborg 
2008). The Canadian childcare movement, like the concurrent second-wave women’s 
movement, has long been concerned with quality-of-life issues such as children’s well-
being, work–family balance, along with gender justice although access to childcare 
is also directly related to the material reality of families’ lives. Suh (2011, p. 142) in an 
examination of the women’s movement in Korea and its “dual strategy” of conflict and 
cooperation to repeal the family headship system showed “that crossing the boundaries 
between civil society and the state is not only frequent but also sometimes highly effica-
cious in achieving goals, precisely because the movement in question can capitalize on 
a much wider than usual array of strategic repertoires by blending participation with 
mobilization”.
Other cross-national studies of women’s movements reveal new forms of action that 
are less publicly visible suggesting that repertoires of contention, structures of mobiliza-
tion and SMO professionalization processes among other features of social movements 
can be gendered (Ferree and Mueller 2004, p. 577). Ferree and Mueller (2004, p. 598) 
claim that “gendered repertories of contention are strategic responses to institutions that 
structure oppression and opportunity along lines of gender” and that situate men and 
women in different social locations. Taylor and Van Dyke (2004) also explain that exter-
nal macrohistorical conditions and internal movement processes (i.e. level of organiza-
tion among collective actors, cultural frames of meaning to justify collective action and 
the structural power of the actors) influence tactical repertoires that go beyond visible 
protesting to cooperation with the state. Giugni and Passy (1998) identify conditions 
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of cooperation between a social movement and government which include, at the state 
level, the inclusive strategies of power holders, the government’s political orientation 
and the openness of public administration to movement actors. Suh (2011, 127) puts it 
another way stating that “the mode of interaction between the social movement and the 
state is thus far from uniform—conflictive and/or cooperative simultaneously, depend-
ing on time, place, and issue”.
Some scholars examining childcare campaigns highlight the importance of particular 
mobilization and organizational resources in influencing political action and policy suc-
cesses. Tyyska’s (1998) focus on Finland, as well as Ball and Charles’ (2006) on Wales, 
found that female political insiders (whether through direct participation or powerful 
blocs in national politics) created new opportunities for activists to influence child-
care policy change. In Sweden and West Germany, Naumann (2005) showed that pub-
lic childcare mobilization is affected by differences in the political opportunities under 
which feminists develop their claims and in their collective identity formation as a 
feminist organization. Kremer (2006) documented how universal childcare provision in 
Denmark was a result of advocacy by women and social pedagogues from childcare pro-
grammes who jointly used a discursive resource—the ideal of professional care— that 
resonated with the state. Analysing childcare campaigns in six countries, Goss et  al. 
(2007) point to a link between the stratification of the movements’ human resources in 
terms of class, and the childcare “systems” that countries implemented (i.e. a one-class 
integrated movement resulted in a system of universal provision). In an edited collec-
tion, scholars and advocates analysed the Canadian childcare movement before 2001 
(Prentice 2001) and recommended a range of repertoires of contention within particular 
sociopolitical environments (Martin 2001; White 2001). There is little research on how 
Canadian childcare SMOs mobilized their claims and sought to influence government 
over the next decade, a turbulent period of social, political and economic highs and lows. 
Australian scholars, Bown et al. (2009, p. 196), have urged researchers to further exam-
ine which factors influence politicians’ decisions to undertake policy initiatives, noting 
that early childhood stakeholders may overestimate who and what influences these deci-
sions and underestimate their own capacities to contribute to decision-making.
Dobrowolsky and Jenson (2004) and Dobrowolsky and Saint-Martin (2009) have called 
attention to the Canadian state’s social investment perspective (investment in the early 
years yields future economic returns), child poverty and welfare reform strategy in the 
1990s. They contend that the social investment perspective has led to the disappearance 
of women’s full citizenship, economic autonomy and well-being through access to child-
care from the political agenda. These scholars suggest that grassroots childcare advo-
cacy groups, which are typically confrontational and focused on women’s rights, have 
become marginalized as the social investment perspective ascended. Consistent with 
this claim, Collier (2012, p. 301) found that while “women” and “gender equality” are not 
completely absent from policy discussions, feminist messages are more often muted or 
confused with more state-friendly gender-neutral frames. In contrast, McGrane (2014, 
p. 1) has recently argued that in Atlantic Canada “an alliance of bureaucratic champions 
and unified childcare sectors” effectively used a social investment perspective “to take 
advantage of opportunities presented by new circumstances in their childcare systems 
to engender structural reforms”. Given this variation, it is important to understand how 
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and why a conflictual-cooperation CCAAC–government relationship characterizes the 
period from 2003 to 2005.
Methods
This study is part of a 4-year research project examining relationships between the 
Canadian childcare advocacy movement and the professionalization of the early child-
hood education and care sector in three provinces and on the national level from 2001 to 
2010.2 Along with content and critical discourse analysis of public advocacy messaging 
(Langford et  al. 2013; Richardson and Langford 2014), 34 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with key players in provincial and national childcare SMOs about their 
advocacy experiences during high and low times of childcare policy action. Interview 
question topics included: (1) an informant’s involvement inside or outside of a childcare 
SMO; (2) perceptions of a SMO’s approach to activism and/or advocacy (political oppor-
tunities, organizational goals and strategies, initiatives, internal dynamics, resources 
such as leadership structure, gender composition, funding, key political and organiza-
tional allies, main struggles/barriers to success, future plans); (3) the extent, effects and 
consequences of professionalization of the ECEC sector on childcare SMOs; (4) and 
views on Canadian childcare SMOs’ successes.
For the purposes of this paper, we focus on three groups, drawn from the larger 
pool of informants. The first group consisted of nine interviews with key informants 
involved with the CCAAC between 2003 and 2006 (when a Conservative government 
was elected). These interviewees included current and former CCAAC board members, 
executive directors, employees, coordinators and representatives from the Council of 
Advocates. While they were not asked to self-identify, the majority of CCAAC advo-
cates and CCAAC allies are white, middle-class women between the ages of 35 and 70. 
The second group of interviews (a purposive and snowball sample) was made up of five 
informants considered to be allies of CCAAC, who offered their perspectives on the 
CCAAC’s relationship with the federal government. These interviewees were from other 
childcare SMOs who advocated for and/or researched childcare policies, the ECEC 
workforce and professionalization of the sector. The final group consisted of five inform-
ants, two male former federal elected leaders, and three women: one senior-level elected 
provincial official and two federal civil servants who were asked specifically about the 
government’s relationship with childcare advocacy SMOs including CCAAC from 2003 
to 2005. In these interviews there was a focus on observations for the future rather than 
on recollections of the past. Interviews with government policy makers, along with some 
CCAAC staff members, are consistent with “elite interviews” recommended by Logan 
et al. (2014, p. 172). Elite interviews involve “high profile personnel who have had access 
to specialized knowledge and power and provide valuable policy information”. They are 
seen to offer “a means of gaining insight into the multiplicity of influences on policy and 
to uncover the less easily detectable layers of early childhood (EC) policy development”. 
While it seems counterintuitive to include the leaders of a grassroots childcare advocacy 
organization in the category of “elite”, in the sociopolitical climate over the 2003–2005 
2 Another part of our study specifically included a critical discourse analysis of CCAAC public advocacy messages and 
identity construction in 2005 and 2008 (author).
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period, CCAAC executives were key players/public figures in policy discussions and 
development.
In total, this paper draws on the analysis of 18 interviews with informants familiar 
with CCAAC’s relationship with government from 2003 to 2005. In coding and analysis, 
we focused on responses to the following questions from the longer interviews: What 
words would you use to describe the Canadian childcare movement? How would you 
characterize CCAAC’s relationship with the federal government before and after 2005? 
What would they recommend for future childcare advocacy in Canada? Answers to 
these questions served as a starting point of our analysis. Interview content was organ-
ized into charts for analysis and comparison purposes. The chart categorized key quotes 
that highlighted an informant’s perspective on a particular issue or theme (i.e. CCAAC’s 
relationship with the Liberal government from 2003 to 2005). The language used in each 
quote was then closely analysed and evaluated as being either conflictual, cooperative 
or both. For example, we analysed informants’ recommendations for future advocacy to 
ascertain whether they would recommend continued cooperation or conflict with the 
federal government.
We collectively cross-checked for inter-rater reliability, which was close to 95 % agree-
ment with the first two groups of informants because coded content typically were 
answers to particular interview questions. However, the less-structured interviews 
with senior-level policy makers (our third group) required us to review the whole tran-
script and come to agreement about which content was related to the guiding questions. 
Finally we looked for consistencies and inconsistencies in perspectives about CCAAC’s 
relationship with government from 2003 to 2005.
Results
Given that the CCAAC is a grassroots SMO, and not a professional organization like the 
CCCF (the national professional ECEC workforce sector association), we expected to 
uncover a militant and confrontational characterization of CCAAC activities that would 
illustrate contentious politics. Instead, we were surprised by what we found.
CCAAC staff and member perspectives
CCAAC staff and members provided some important and interesting insights about the 
SMO’s relationship with the Liberal government—a relationship which we, after close 
analysis, identified as conflictual-cooperation. For example, these informants reported 
that the CCAAC did “push” the government on some issues, but deliberately held back 
on others. As one senior staff person noted, “we [were] all trying to work towards the 
greater good even if we [didn’t] quite agree [with government] on the details”. Another 
informant echoed this comment and added that the political climate in the early 2000s 
was both “hopeful and frustrating”. When probed about this, she explained it was hope-
ful because the Liberal government had launched a nascent early childhood develop-
ment agreement, and “research about child development and the economic benefits of 
childcare was flourishing”. However, from this informant’s perspective, it was frustrating 
that there was still reluctance by the Liberal government to focus specifically on a uni-
versal childcare programme as opposed to early “learning”, early intervention or family 
resource programmes which represent more targeted programming.
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While CCAAC advocates experienced a collegial, respectful relationship with the then 
Minister of Social Development, Ken Dryden, they explained that their conversations 
were tense at times. A senior staff person described an overall warmth and acceptance 
between CCAAC advocates and Dryden, but recalled apologizing for pushing him hard 
on the for-profit childcare issue. She reported Dryden’s response: “You have your job to 
do, I have my job to do, and this is how we get better public policy”.
Informants described some tactics that brought the CCAAC into visible conflict with 
the government. For example, CCAAC released a number of report cards, facts sheets 
and open letters to educate the public on childcare issues and to call the government 
to account for their slow action. During the time the federal government and the prov-
inces were negotiating the funding conditions of the bilateral agreements-in-principles, 
informants described “rolling out” a petition at the first ministers meeting in Newfound-
land, holding rallies outside of ministerial meetings and then “going into” the meetings.
At the same time as they adopted some conflictual tactics, CCAAC informants agreed 
that the period from 2003 to 2005 was a positive, “high time” for the SMO, because it 
was actively working with government to achieve its goals. Informants characterized this 
time as one of “optimism” and “opportunity”. One informant, who was involved with the 
CCAAC as both a board member and executive director from 2000 to 2012, referred it 
to a “great” childcare movement. She characterized the CCAAC as a “glorious wonder of 
an organization” that had sufficient funding and human resources, and a strong organi-
zational structure and leadership. A pioneering representative on the Council of Advo-
cates drew attention to the societal (and hence government) agreement about the need 
to invest in new systems such as a national childcare system during the 1990s and into 
the early 2000s. Another staff person described a “positive momentum with the Martin 
Liberal government [in which] to some degree he was interested in child poverty issues 
and that provided us from time to time a door into discussions [with government]”.
Several informants noted that during this period (2003–2005), the CCAAC initiated 
“pivotal pieces of the evidence for the childcare movement”. Interestingly, this was partly 
due to a shift in the way CCAAC acquired funding. Prior to this point, the CCAAC had 
received Status of Women Canada (SWC) funding for its efforts as a women’s rights 
organization based on feminist principles. An informant observed that being rooted in a 
women’s rights discourse vis-à-vis SWC funding “was good for CCAAC and it was good 
for child care”. In the early 2000s, this funding policy changed to application/project-
based funding. In order to receive funds, the CCAAC was required to produce reports 
that, according to one informant, had to include what the government “wanted to hear.” 
At the same time, these reports (like From Patchwork to Framework, CCAAC 2004) 
became part of the evidence used to support the Liberal government initiative to move 
towards an early learning strategy. Another example came in 2005, when the CCAAC 
was awarded federal funding (through the Social Development Partnerships Program) 
for a three-year project titled “Making the Connections”, which tracked what provinces 
were doing with federal social transfers earmarked for childcare. This was considered by 
some CCAAC informants to be a “significant” advocacy outcome for their organization.
The 2003–2005 period was described as a time when the Liberal federal government 
and the CCAAC shared expertise, lived experiences and policy analyses to help create 
the bilateral policy agreements. During this period, informants characterized CCAAC’s 
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relationship with the federal government as “positive”, “exciting and interesting”. A for-
mer Board member described the sociopolitical climate as shifting considerably. She 
explained that public discourse about ECEC policy “was a big iceberg” that rose with 
more information and dialogue, but “now [post 2006] it’s sinking in heavy seas and there 
is just a little tip [of the iceberg] that you can see”. Informants described 2003–2005 as 
a time when the federal Liberal government was supportive of CCAAC’s participation 
in ECEC policy development—“they were working together to produce better childcare 
policy”. From one informant’s perspective, the CCAAC was able to influence govern-
ment’s use of language in reference to ECEC (i.e. ‘daycare as support for welfare recipi-
ents’ changed to ‘childcare for young children’). Moreover, the CCAAC worked with 
executive assistants of federal Members of Parliament (MPs) and policy analysts to make 
sure MPs had sufficient information and/or resources to make their case for a national 
childcare strategy. The CCAAC had, as one informant stated, “a line of bureaucrats in 
many provinces and in Ottawa [Canada’s capital]” who would talk to staff and MPs about 
policy initiatives. Indeed, CCAAC advocates could call up ministers and advise them to 
take particular directions in their approach to a national childcare system. A former staff 
person added: “You [could] call up…the minister and say…this is what we need you to 
do–we need you to lead the way and we need you to talk to your colleague in Manitoba”.
After 2006, CCAAC’s access to and relationship with the federal government abruptly 
shut down. Indicative of this shift, one former CCAAC staff person recalled being ques-
tioned by a Conservative MP about her salary when she appeared before a parliamen-
tary committee in 2007. On another occasion, a Conservative MP met her beside the 
centennial flame on Parliament Hill and said, “We’ll give you money if you support us in 
our approach”. She responded: “It is not about you, it’s about children and families and 
mothers who can’t afford to raise their kids. This has been our position forever since we 
began…and it’s not going to change.”
CCAAC informants described the political climate after 2006 as “mean-spirited”, 
“chilly” and “frightening”. Interview data from this informant group shows no vision of 
a future in which the CCAAC could again work cooperatively with a national govern-
ment on ECEC policy. One informant stated the CCAAC has been “deeply affected by 
the [current] assault on democracy and democratic participation…and the undermin-
ing of the legitimacy of critical voices as an essential piece of democracy”. The political 
climate after 2006 sharpened some informants’ perspective that the childcare movement 
is pursuing “a significant new public system in an era of dismantling public systems”—
a radical demand, and one that rejects the state’s neo-liberal/neo-conservative orienta-
tion. Two informants, for example, pointed to the movement’s claims that “profoundly 
challenge women’s work” and “expose the failure of the free market” to support women’s 
childcare needs. One of these informants also noted that the research evidence that per-
suaded the Liberal government to launch the childcare bilateral agreements was com-
pletely ignored by the Conservative government elected in 2006 which appeared “to be 
motivated more by ideology than by evidence”. Most informants shared the view that the 
mandate of the CCAAC during a period of conflict with government should be two-fold: 
to continue to provide analyses of public policy and policy solutions and to engage in 
public education about childcare issues.
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CCAAC allies
The second set of interviews were with CCAAC allies, including members of other child-
care SMOs, the ECEC workforce and its professional bodies. All five informants in this 
group regarded CCAAC as a legitimate and “tenacious” representative of the childcare 
movement at the national level. These informants considered 2003–2005 to be an his-
toric period in which the CCAAC had to make use of the Liberal government’s “politi-
cal will” and their childcare plan as a policy opening and opportunity. However, this set 
of interview data revealed mixed, and more critical perspectives on CCAAC’s strategic 
approach with government. One informant among this group assessed the CCAAC’s use 
of the government preferred “human capital argument” as being too cooperative and 
conciliatory. Thus she described the CCAAC’s use of this argument as “the wrong thing” 
although “for the right reason” in that it served as common ground in a SMO–state 
relationship. Another informant found CCAAC advocates (some she identified as hav-
ing crossed over from the women’s/social justice movements) highly contentious in that 
they were “always finding fault in any policy proposed by government”. After the cancel-
lation of the childcare bilateral agreements, these informants recommended a renewal 
of the childcare movement with a new generation of advocates and the strengthening of 
childcare SMO collaboration.
Senior‑level elected officials and civil servants
The third group of informants enriched our findings. The five senior policy makers (two 
federal elected officials, one provincial-elected official and two civil servants) who were 
interviewed viewed CCAAC’s relationship with the government as generally coopera-
tive. They saw the CCAAC as a legitimate part of a larger sustained childcare movement 
that had “long struggle[d]” to advance childcare policy at the national level. One govern-
ment informant acknowledged a “slow recognition (of the importance of the early years) 
that comes out of all the work of 30 years”. Another informant, reminiscing on the strong 
efforts by the CCAAC, and lamenting the loss of momentum after 2006, remarked that 
today, “we need a strong movement”.
Government insiders reflecting on the 2003–2005 period tended to refer—respect-
fully—to individual advocates who stood out or with whom they recalled working 
closely, rather than to the CCAAC as a childcare movement organization. Government 
leaders who were interviewed recalled having collegial and respectful personal rela-
tionships and interactions with CCAAC staff rather than impersonal, bureaucratic and 
formal meetings. For example, one government informant remarked: “[Our] responsi-
bilities are not different …You leave your hats at the door… [so that] it is not the govern-
ment of Canada or the CCAAC…on the table is childcare and making it work. I think for 
the most part, we were able to do that”. Another informant commented that he “got to 
know the ED [executive director] of CCAAC quite well”. Still another informant stated “I 
did not have any conflict [with advocates] that I’m aware of…I thought we were working 
quite successfully towards our plan”.
Only one informant recalled a time of overt conflict between government and a child-
care SMO during the bilateral federal-provincial negotiations, but this conflict about 
funding for-profit childcare programmes did not involve staff or members of CCAAC. 
For the most part cooperative and respectful relationships between the government 
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and advocates were described—though these relationships did appear to take conscious 
effort on the part of government representatives. One government informant expressed 
respect and admiration at the remarkable level of dedication the advocates possessed: 
“In some cases it is sort of beyond commitment, they have come to embody what it is 
they are doing. It was not external to them…It’s what they do. It’s the friends they have. 
It’s the people they like to be around…It was just them”. This particular government 
insider saw this as a strength of advocates, and stated:
They are terrific to deal with because their beliefs are so strong…people who are 
advocates for childcare—they believe. For the occasional difficult moment that it 
generates, you get 20 more of the right kind of moments, and you know, I enjoyed it 
a lot.
The biggest hurdle this informant described when working with CCAAC advo-
cates at this time was the “lingering skepticisms” towards the government on the part 
of advocates. Given the long history of empty promises and historical childcare policy 
let-downs, this government leader made an explicit effort to re-establish trust through 
spending a great deal of time discussing issues, speaking at and attending conferences, 
and personally meeting with childcare advocates across the country.
When asked what recommendations senior policy makers had for advocates, a num-
ber expressed sentiments such as: “keep the faith” and “trust people in the future”. In 
addition, specific tactic/approaches as to how to approach and work effectively with the 
government were discussed. Recognizing that childcare policy under the Conservative 
government had been sidelined at the national level, one of these informants recom-
mended staying connected to “childcare movements in other countries where things 
are happening”. In the Canadian political context after 2006, this informant stressed the 
necessity of forging relationships with the opposition government: “Always consider the 
opposition as the government in waiting. Find out who can champion this”. Indeed these 
informants communicated a great deal of optimism that “childcare won before, and it 
can win again”. From one policy maker’s perspective, the focus going forward should be 
on the “big fight”—creating a national childcare system—before focusing on “the little 
fights” (i.e. which childcare services for-profit and/or not-for-profit should be funded).
There was some difference of opinion among this group of informants as to which 
rationale would be most effective to promote childcare policy when in conversation 
with government. One key informant adamantly stressed the importance of emphasiz-
ing “early learning” (and the economic arguments this discourse is often coupled with) 
over “childcare”. Another informant challenged the need to choose one discourse over 
the other. He suggested that what is needed instead is a “different understanding,” that 
childcare and early learning are complementary components of lifelong learning. The 
intergenerational equity rationale, which highlights the lack of economic opportunities 
young families face today (despite their increased levels of education as compared to a 
generation before), was also thought to be an important argument to stress with policy 
makers. Finally, it was interesting to note that these government policy makers in gen-
eral shied away from childcare framed as a women’s issue. One informant overtly cau-
tioned against making it “too much of a feminist issue”. Another informant explained the 
thinking behind such a statement: “if we normalize talking about the need for childcare 
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because of all these different reasons and don’t say it’s a women’s issue then it’s all of our 
responsibility…so don’t give them the out “saying ‘it’s a women’s issue’…don’t give them 
that…to take it away”.
These interviewees stressed the importance of drawing on the language and ration-
ale most congruent with the worldview of the government representative of the time; 
for example, one informant suggested that “if the minister you’re talking to is a scien-
tist, bring scientific empirical data”. This recommendation brings attention back to the 
importance of not only the sociopolitical context in which advocates are operating, but 
the importance of the immediate personal and relational context of policy negotiations.
These findings about SMO–government relations provide important insights about 
childcare and childcare policy from the point of view of government officials. Overall, 
respectful and cordial relations between select government officials who were making 
policy in the 2003–2005 period and CCAAC advocates who were interviewed in our 
study were described. Contrary to what we anticipated, our findings suggest that from 
2003 to 2005 CCAAC tactics, and government responses point to conflictual-coopera-
tion between a childcare SMO and government. But it is important to emphasize that 
the CCAAC was only close to government during this 2003–2005 period. Prior to 2003 
interactions between CCAAC and the government were largely conflictual and after the 
election of the Conservatives in 2006 all interactions between CCAAC and the govern-
ment ceased.
Discussion
Our analysis of interview data shows that the CCAAC’s relationship with the federal 
government can be characterized as conflictual-cooperation from 2003 to 2005, in that 
these ECEC stakeholders worked together to produce better policy. Prior to this period, 
the CCAAC frequently opposed government initiatives that they viewed as negatively 
affecting ECEC provision. After years of largely conflictual and antagonistic CCAAC–
government relations, our findings suggest that from 2003 to 2005 these relations can 
be described as conflictual-cooperation. Several factors appear to have encouraged 
cooperation between the CCAAC and the Liberal government. First, the sociopolitical 
environment shifted once the social investment perspective emerged as a key rationale 
for the Martin Liberal government’s focus on a national early childhood education and 
care strategy. As reported by informants, the CCAAC also shifted its advocacy messag-
ing to include this perspective. Secondly, the Liberal government required the complex 
knowledge held by the CCAAC to launch a national childcare system and was willing to 
include social movement actors in public policy development (Giugni and Passy 1998). 
Thirdly, the CCAAC had the internal resources, a formal structure and sufficient staff to 
undertake a CCAAC/government collaboration.
Our results show that the CCAAC employed a “tactical repertoire” (Taylor and Van 
Dyke 2004, p. 271) that was responsive to the sociopolitical environment (linked to mac-
rohistorical factors and post-materialist values) and potentially illustrates “apparent 
shifts in forms of political contention in Western nations”. CCAAC’s tactics, and its rela-
tions with other more professionalized childcare SMOs, also changed depending on the 
sociopolitical and economic climate. For example, one CCAAC staff person described a 
point in which distinctions between CCAAC, being outside of government, and CCCF, 
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working in or with government, were considerably blurred. The CCAAC benefited from 
CCCF’s insider relationship with the government when the CCCF executive director 
became a political staffer for the Minister of Social Development. Nevertheless, some 
CCAAC informants described how at times, national childcare SMOs were in competi-
tion with one another, particularly after the Status of Women funding ceased in the early 
2000s and they were forced to apply and compete for limited project funding offered by 
Ottawa. After 2006, when national childcare SMOs struggled to mobilize due to an unfa-
vourable sociopolitical climate and the loss of human and financial resources, the SMOs 
began to work more closely together.
Prior to 2006, Mahon (2009) describes Liberal policy as “inspired by an increasingly 
social form of inclusive liberalism” (p. 59). Liberals viewed public investment in child-
care as a way to address the social risks of childhood, promote early childhood learning 
and development and thus invest in a better future for citizens. This social investment 
perspective was an adjustment to an unrestrained neo-liberal free market approach that 
disadvantaged the most vulnerable in society but did not return to the old welfare state 
that had become too costly (Dobrowolsky and Jenson 2004; Dobrowolsky and Saint-
Martin 2005; Prentice 2009). White (2004 p. 673) argues that during the Liberal federal 
years the reframing of childcare to early learning as social investment was a “powerful” 
discursive tool because “it appeals to already existing norms and already institutional-
ized policy programs (i.e., education as a means of social mobility) and allows govern-
ments sympathetic to these arguments to mount a defense of their public investment 
to both the public and opposition party officials”. Fischer’s (2003, p. 23) critical, con-
structivist policy analysis framework also suggests that contemporary political action is 
“shaped and controlled by the discourses that supply it with meaning” which requires 
childcare movement actors to be consciously strategic in their own advocacy messaging 
and tactics and to consider how well this messaging resonates with the state’s priorities 
(Giugni and Passy 1998).
In addition, when the Liberal government began to develop a new childcare strategy 
in the early 2000s, they were willing to work with civil society actors which included 
the CCAAC. Thus from 2003 to 2005 in particular, a receptive sociopolitical environ-
ment and a window of political opportunity opened up for the CCAAC, an inclusive 
orientation which Giugni and Passy describe as a critical condition for cooperation. We 
argue that from 2003 to 2005 the CCAAC adjusted its tactics from contention to con-
flictual-cooperation in response to a more favourable sociopolitical environment. How-
ever this alignment with the Liberal government’s approach to state policies reflected 
highly instrumental and strategic decisions rather than a wholesale endorsement, since 
we know from other interview analyses that advocates privately prioritize and are moti-
vated in their advocacy work by the conviction that childcare is a women’s equity and 
justice issue (Langford and Richardson 2013). One informant states that the CCAAC 
chose “the right message [social investment] with the right person [Paul Martin and Ken 
Dryden] at the right time [inclusive liberalism]”. Indeed our interviews with government 
policy makers show that childcare as a women’s equity issue did not resonate with them 
as a government priority. However, CCAAC staff interviews indicate that the organiza-
tion reluctantly adopted the “social investment” message and set aside messaging that 
focused on childcare as a women’s equity issue, likely because childcare advocates are 
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not completely at odds with a perspective that focuses on child poverty, early learn-
ing and intervention. Our earlier studies (Langford et  al. 2013; Richardson and Lang-
ford 2014) using content and critical discourse analysis also demonstrate that a women’s 
equity discourse was muted in CCAAC public messaging in 2005 and 2008.
While Dobrowolsky and Jenson (2004) maintain that grassroots childcare SMOs are 
more likely to be confrontational and on the “outside” because of their focus on women’s 
rights, in our view, the CCAAC adjusted its message to focus on social investment and 
employed conflictual-cooperation strategies. Indeed, it could be argued that CCAAC’s 
flexible and less publicly visible tactical repertoire (i.e. framing the need for childcare 
as social investment, policy reports and insider negotiations with senior policy makers) 
contributed to policy success, at least until 2006 when the government changed. Mahon 
describes the successful policy outcomes: “Between April and November 2005, [the gov-
ernment] negotiated bilateral agreements with all ten provinces. All agreements referred 
to the QUAD [quality, universal, inclusive, accessible and developmental], though 
only eight of them made it clear that investments would be made exclusively in regu-
lated child care” (Mahon 2009, p. 59). On the other hand, some informants asked if the 
CCAAC should have pushed the Liberal government harder earlier: “[we can] take some 
victory in the bilateral agreements that were signed but clearly they weren’t sufficiently 
embedded [in legislation] as a benefit for families in order to survive an election”. Mahon 
(2009) rightly points out how easy it was for the Conservatives to “kill the policy” on 
the first day after the election given it had never been legislated (and therefore was not 
legally binding). Jenson (2009, p. 42) maintains that although the social investment per-
spective may have served to move childcare policy forward during the Liberal years, it is 
also “the culprit that set in motion the social mechanism of writing women out” of the 
childcare story.
Giugni and Passy (1998) claim that SMO/government cooperation arises when the 
government requires the complex knowledge held by the SMO to develop public policy. 
All those interviewed recognized that CCAAC’s childcare policy expertise had been a 
key resource for the Liberal government’s political social investment goals beginning in 
the early 2000s and later when the federal-provincial bilateral agreements-in-principle 
were developed. While the CCAAC did “push” the government at times, informants 
generally agreed that the CCAAC and the Liberal government [were] “all trying to work 
towards the greater good”. Interestingly senior policy makers did not perceive this “push-
ing” as conflict perhaps because, as politicians, they regularly dealt with often intense 
political conflict. Thus, SMO expertise and a common goal set the stage for CCAAC–
government cooperation from 2003 to 2005. However, the defeat of the Liberal govern-
ment in 2006 meant that the consultative role the CCAAC played did not evolve into 
“integration” and/or “delegation” roles which Giugni and Passy (1998) describe as evi-
dence of a deeper cooperative relationship between a SMO and government.
Based on one of Giugni and Passy’s conditions for SMO–government cooperation—
a professionalized SMO—CCAAC’s formal structure and the active involvement of its 
executive director in policy development seems to have contributed to this coopera-
tion. In addition this cooperation could be associated with one of Taylor and Van Dyke’s 
(2004) key features of tactical repertories—an SMO’s collective identity. In this case, it 
may have to do, in part, with the gendered nature of this particular issue and childcare 
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advocacy community (Ferree and Mueller 2004). Although not a viewpoint shared by 
all informants, several indicated that the Canadian childcare movement (of which the 
CCAAC is a significant part) is more oriented to being cooperative than conflictual. Sev-
eral advocates, as well as senior policy makers, broadly refer to how the CCAAC “does 
advocacy” as an organization. A long-time member describes childcare advocacy as an 
“expression of women’s ways”, “rooted in the culture of early childhood” in which “rela-
tionships matter most” in mobilizing activities. CCAAC’s approach to politics is charac-
terized by some informants as “less militant and confrontational than that of the labour 
movement and feminist organizations” which results in different choices of action. More 
analysis is needed to assess if CCAAC’s repertoire of cooperation is gendered and if it 
is a “strategic response to institutions that structure oppression and opportunity along 
lines of gender” (Ferree and Mueller’s 2004, p. 598). In addition, this characterization of 
the CCAAC as more cooperative than conflictual highlights Giugni and Passy’s impor-
tant assertion that the state needs to be willing to work with a SMO in order for a coop-
erative SMO–government relationship to develop. In other words, prior to 2003, the 
CCAAC may have had a cooperation orientation consistent with characterizations of 
new social movements but earlier governments were not open to using this cooperation 
for policy development. On the basis of our findings, it can be said then that the CCAAC 
was more likely to be cooperative with government when possible but did not shy away 
from contention when necessary, although questions remain about the gendered nature 
of this contention.
Our finding of CCAAC’s conflictual-cooperation relationship with the Liberal govern-
ment from 2003 to 2005 points to, as one informant remarked, “more similarities than 
differences” between the CCAAC (the grassroots national SMO) and CCCF, (the profes-
sional national childcare SMO). Consistent with traditional divisions between grassroots 
and professionalized SMOs, we expected that informants would report differences, and 
perhaps even hostility, in how the two SMOs were positioned in relation to government. 
Informants did identify the mandates of the two SMOs as different, as well as make ref-
erences to the tactical choices that CCCF had made to play an ‘insider’ game in contrast 
to the ‘outsider’ positioning of the CCAAC. But upon further analysis, the interview 
data indicate that both national SMOs from 2003 to 2005 had an “insider” relationship 
with the Liberal government. The more grassroots CCAAC was less confrontational 
than would have been expected from its past history. Our case study thus contributes 
to Giugni and Passy’s (1998, p. 105) observation that new social movements can involve 
“a qualitatively new form of incorporation of noninstitutional actors into the political 
system”.
However as Mahon (2009, p. 61) argues “party politics does indeed matter”. The day 
after the 2006 federal election, the conflictual-cooperation relationship CCAAC had 
with government was severed. After 2006 “the Harper government made it clear that 
it had no interest in the kind of ‘social investment’ model favoured by the Liberals” 
(Mahon, p. 61). Moreover, the Conservative government followed their elimination of 
the Liberal childcare programme with significant funding cuts to all organizations con-
cerned with children, women and families including the CCAAC and CCCF.
While the CCAAC’s cooperation with the Liberal government prior to 2006 might 
raise questions about whether it is a SMO or a special interest group after 2006 the 
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CCAAC was clearly a SMO in conflict with a Conservative government. The unprec-
edented speed with which the Conservatives rolled back the Liberal’s childcare policy 
sharpened some informants’ views that CCAAC demands were radical and represent, 
as one informant stated, “a major social policy [shift] that would fundamentally change 
gender relations,” a change that [a] Conservative government in particular would 
“fiercely resist”. This roll back illustrates Giugni and Passy’s (1998, p. 90) description of 
an exclusive state with “concentrated…structures of power… [and]…few points of access 
to external actors” which do not favour a cooperative SMO/government relationship.
Compounding the reality that the CCAAC was in conflict with the Conservative 
government after 2006, it became extremely difficult for the SMO to mobilize due to 
the loss of human and financial resources and thus formal and professional structures 
(Giugni and Passy 1998). We suggest that before 2006 the CCAAC demonstrated a 
conflictual-cooperation orientation which flourished when the sociopolitical environ-
ment was right. After 2006 some informants described the CCAAC as “weak”, “frag-
ile” and “down but not completely out”. CCAAC’s repertoire of contention was limited 
after 2006 but its tactics suggest a more conflictual stance that returns to its roots. For 
example, in 2010, the CCAAC launched a campaign, “Child Care is a Right,” in which it 
stressed this return: “the child care movement began as a central issue of the women’s 
right movement so it’s natural that we would return to our roots and begin to explore 
child care from a women’s, children and family rights position” (CCAAC website 2013). 
The CCAAC chose an advocacy message in conflict with the Conservative government’s 
views on child care, one which, according to one senior staff person, would also “excite 
CCAAC’s membership.” The new campaign used the international stage to shed light on 
Canada’s lack of progress in relation to childcare provision, which resulted in the Cana-
dian government being taken “to court” in Geneva. But the CCAAC recognized that it 
could not sustain a major campaign, so instead participated as a partner in the “Code 
Blue for Child Care” campaign which was funded and led by labour unions. In 2013 a 
national campaign, “Rethink Child Care”, was launched also under union leadership and 
included CCAAC board members. Despite misgivings about collaboration with labour 
unions articulated by a few of our informants, the CCAAC did not hesitate to draw on 
its allies and networks, including labour unions to join more contentious pan-Canadian 
campaigns. In this regard, CCAAC’s advocacy activities run counter to some senior 
policy makers’ perspectives that childcare advocates are typically more cooperative than 
contentious in their relations with government. On the other hand, as discussed earlier, 
some CCAAC advocates acknowledge the organization’s more cooperative orientation 
which could be exercised if the government, even a Conservative one, sought coop-
eration with the SMO. Following one government informant’s recommendation, the 
CCAAC instead worked cooperatively with an opposition party, the New Democratic 
Party, on Bill C-373 which sought to establish through legislation criteria and conditions 
in respect of funding for early learning and childcare programmes (did not become law). 
What seems clear then in CCAAC’s mobilization tactics after 2006 is that they were 
deliberate responses to changes in the sociopolitical climate and in CCAAC’s internal 
resources. Thus while our case study’s focus on a particular time period may limit the 
generalizability of findings, it can illuminate how under certain conditions an SMO and 
a government established a working relationship to bring about social change.
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After 2006 childcare advocates at the national level did what informants recom-
mended, mentoring a new generation of advocates and building solidarity between 
childcare SMOs and allies such as unions. Many informants noted that the maintenance 
of the childcare movement depended on cooperation between the two national SMOs, 
as neither had funding, or the ear of government. Ironically, one informant suggests con-
tention with the Conservative federal government “helped” bring all the organizations 
together around a common table. She stated it “helped CCAAC’s working relationship 
with CCCF… [and]…it has helped bring labour into the picture in a way that can’t be 
marginalized”. In November 2014, the fourth national childcare conference (organized 
by childcare SMOs) was held in Winnipeg, Manitoba, the historic site of the previous 
conferences. Back during the third national conference in 2004, Canada was on the brink 
of a national childcare system. Over a decade later, the 2014 conference was part of 
preparations for the anticipated 2015 federal election, in which childcare SMOs, includ-
ing the CCAAC, made strategic and tactical choices to promote childcare as an election 
issue. Advocates we interviewed predicted that without a significant shift in the political 
climate, conflictual-cooperation would not be possible. On October 19, 2015, a majority 
Liberal government led by Justin Trudeau was elected and committed to developing a 
new national early learning and child care framework. This presents an opportunity for 
the CCAAC to re-establish a conflictual-cooperation relationship with Trudeau’s Liberal 
government. Whether or not the CCAAC has the resources and capacity to build this 
relationship with the government remains to be seen.
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